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Panel I: The Changing Landscape of
First Amendment Jurisprudence in
Light of the New Communications and
Media Alliances
Moderator: James C. Goodale, Esq. a
Panelists: J. Richard Devlin, Esq.b
Theodore C. Hirt, Esq.'
Andrew A. Merdek, Esq.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Today is a very exciting moment
for me because I've taught a course in this area for so long and felt
as though there was no one to appreciate some of the policy issues
that are involved in the subject that we're talking about today.
More of that in a moment.
First, I want to introduce our panelists. On my far left is Rich
Devlin, Executive Vice President, External Affairs, Sprint Commu-
nications, and he came in from Kansas City for this forum.
Sitting next to him is Andy Merdek, Vice President of Legal
Affairs and Corporate Secretary of Cox Enterprises. He came in
from Atlanta.
Additionally, from the Department of Justice, we have Ted Hirt,
a. Chairman, Communications, Intellectual Property, and Entertainment Law Depart-
ment, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, NY; Adjunct Professor, Fordham University
School of Law, New York, NY; Yale University, B.A. 1955; University of Chicago, J.D.
1958 (National Honors Scholar).
b. Executive Vice President, General Counsel and External Affairs, Sprint Corp.,
Kansas City, MO; New Jersey Institute of Technology, B.I.E.; Fordham University, J.D.
c. Assistant Branch Director, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Brown University, A.B. 1971 (magna cum laude, Phi
Beta Kappa), M.A. 1972; University of Chicago, J.D. 1975.
d. Vice President of Legal Affairs, Corporate Secretary, Cox Enterprises, Inc., Atlan-
ta, GA; Middlebury College, A.B. 1972 (magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa); University
of Virginia, J.D. 1978 (Order of the Coif).
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sitting on my right, who is the Assistant Branch Director, Civil
Division, Federal Programs Branch.
Now, let me tell you how we're going to organize the panel.
I'm going to start off by "setting the table." In other words, trying
to say a little bit about what's going on with respect to media alli-
ances, because we, after all, are talking about the changing land-
scape of First Amendment jurisprudence in light of the new com-
munications and media alliances. So to set the table, I'm going to
talk a little bit about the media alliances. Let me mention briefly,
new communications, because the panel, as you can see, will ex-
plain some of the latter to you, following this format.
First, following my "table setting," so to speak, we're going to
discuss the question of whether the existing regulatory scheme can
be appropriately adapted to accommodate the new entity, that is the
new merged entities or joint ventures, however you wish to call
them, and what role the Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") should play. Rich Devlin is going to talk about that, and
he may also answer the question whether it should be one wire or
two.
The second item we want to discuss is how will the Clinton
administration's proposals affect this debate as to what the regula-
tory scheme should be and also how the Clinton administration is
proposing legislation, and Mr. Hirt will explain that to us. More
about that in a moment.
Lastly, Mr. Merdek will tell us about broadcast television, cable
and telephone-what is the proper First Amendment standard to
apply to the converging media entities?
So you will see that we have a very complex subject and not
very much time to talk about it. And one of the things we want to
do as we go through the panel, and after we finish talking, is talk
among ourselves with respect to how the new technology works.
You will hear a little bit of it as the speakers make their presenta-
tion, and of course, we want to talk with you.
I don't think there's anyone I know who knows really how the
technology is all going to turn out. And that, of course, is one of
the driving forces for the new alliances. The change in technology
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is before communication companies, and they do not want to be
left in the lurch.
I'd like to discuss some of the new alliances that we've been
reading about in the newspaper, and I will refresh your recollection
with respect to them. U.S. West has invested in the Time Warner
Cable subsidiary. Southwest Bell has bought the Hauser Cable
interests. Viacom, that story is so overplayed, I hardly dare men-
tion it, but I will refresh your recollection that NYNEX and Block-
buster, at least-maybe there are others, I've lost track of them
all-are venturing with Viacom with respect to its takeover of
Paramount.
TCI, which is the largest cable company, is selling out to Bell
Atlantic. QVC, that other Paramount bidder, has investors from the
Cox Entreprises and from Bell South. Southwest Bell and Cox
have a joint-venture going with respect to the cable operations of
Cox, and Cox, TCI, Comcast, and Continental have a joint-venture
with respect to Teleport.
Why are all these new ventures being put together? The reason
is, generally speaking, we are in the middle of the information
revolution. In my view, it is probably the greatest revolution since
the industrial revolution. Changes are happening every day in our
lives so fast that we can hardly perceive them.
I only need to point out the impact that CNN's coverage of the
Gulf War had on our lives. It changed the news business, it
changed our lives, and of course, computerization has changed our
lives too, and more change is in the offing.
These companies want to be part of that revolution and not
miss it, and each has something to bring to the others. The cable
companies bring expertise in cable communications to the phone
companies. The phone companies, candidly, bring cash to the
cable companies. The cable companies and the phone companies,
at some point in time, want to change their transmission devices
from coaxial in the case of cable, twisted pair in the case of phone
companies, and that's going to take a lot of money. There are
many ways to provide for communications other than through fiber,
but the fiber is the information highway of the future, and everyone
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wants to participate in it.
This participation includes movie companies, newspaper compa-
nies, and the cable companies, to the extent that they have net-
works bringing the so-called software to the party. In other words,
it's great to have all the transmission devices, but if you don't have
anything to show at the other end, then it doesn't make much sense
in terms of the convergence of all the interests I've talked about.
We're not simply talking about the delivery of phone communica-
tions, but of course, computer and what we now think of as broad-
casting cable communications all as one megillah, as they say here
in New York.
In short, there's an increase in capacity with respect to what
can be delivered to the viewer, and everyone wants to be part of
the action, and no one wants to be left out.
So with that as an introduction, I'd like Rich Devlin to speak
to us if he could.
MR. DEVLIN: Good morning, everyone. Jim, I hope we bring
more than cash to the table. Other people brought technology and
software, and then the telephone companies get to bring cash?
I'd like to say a word about Sprint Corporation so you have
some understanding of why our company has an interest in this
debate. Sprint Corporation is probably best known through
Candice Bergen ads promoting our long-distance service. And we
are, in fact, the third largest long-distance company in the United
States.
But lesser known is that we are also a very large local tele-
phone company. We tend to serve rural properties-nineteen states
we're in-and we've got roughly six million access lines. So
we're about one-half the size of a Baby Bell.
We also have very large holdings in cellular, some of which
overlap our telephone company, some of which do not. So we are
very much a full-service telecommunications provider. We have
a very direct interest in a lot of these issues that I'll talk about,
because in many respects, it's our future.
I think Jim did a great job on talking about the convergence,
what's happening out there in terms of joint ventures. Jim, I
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wasn't sure what you were going to talk about, so I had my check-
list.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Is that what we agreed upon? Did
I take one of your subjects?
MR. DEVLIN: Did you miss Bell Atlantic-TCI or did I miss
you saying that?
PROFESSOR GOODALE: I said TCI and Bell Atlantic, yeah.
MR. DEVLIN: I missed that. There is this push for strategic
alliances, as Jim talked about, but maybe I would characterize it as
the herd mentality-the need to have partners such as telephone
companies partnering either through joint-ventures or acquisitions
of cable companies. There's absolutely no question that that's
going on, but there's something else going on below the surface
that doesn't get a lot of attention. Jim alluded to it in a ten-second
reference to Teleport. Teleport is basically a competing local tele-
phone company. It does not compete for most of your business
from your home. What it does is put fiber rings around many large
cities and basically provides access services to long-distance com-
panies. It directly competes with local telephone companies.
Teleport is owned by an unusual group of people: TCI, Time
Warner, Cox, Continental, and Comcast. Five cable companies
own Teleport and compete directly against telephone companies.
Comcast also has a very big cellular presence.
The FCC is in the process of deciding how spectrum will be
auctioned for the next generation of cellular services, known as
personal communications service ("PCS").1 It's next-generation
cellular; it's micro-cell technology. And we're going to see a lot
of cellular companies and a lot of cable companies competing for
PCS. So we're seeing some indirect competition between cable
and telco, and then we're seeing some very direct head-to-head
activities.
Now to the reason why we're here. My role is to give you a
sense of the regulatory models that exist today and provide the
1. See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700 (1993).
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predicate for the rest of this panel and also for the rest of the day.
Maybe this is stating the obvious, but I'll take a shot at stating
what the purpose of the First Amendment is and apply it to the
kinds of expression today.
The notion underlying the First Amendment is to encourage the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources. That's the Supreme Court speaking in the
Associated Press case in 1945.2 And there is the notion that people
will reach the right conclusions if they have access to many
tongues. That is, the marketplace will decide what's valuable and
meaningful, not the government.
Well, applying that broad principle, we can talk about some
models. There's probably three traditional regulatory models out
there. The "print model" is probably the one we're the most famil-
iar with, and print basically enjoys the greatest freedom from gov-
ernment intrusion. In the print model, the publisher may advance
his or her own political views, social views, economic views.
There's no government licensing,'there's no supervision of fairness,
and there's no oversight on judgment. It's very limited government
intrusion, as you all know, and that's basically on the edges of
obscenity and libel. So that's the print model.
Switching now to a model that I'm very familiar with is the
"common carrier" model. The notion of a common carrier model
came from the days when a lot of things were thought to be natural
monopolies. Telecommunications was thought to be a natural mo-
nopoly, and because there was no competition that was thought to
be economically feasible, the government substituted regulation in
its place. The notion of a common carrier under state and federal
regulatory statutes is that the common carrier must provide service
to all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis regardless of content.
That is, the common carrier is precluded by law from making value
judgments or denying access to service because of the underlying
content of the message. The common carrier-in this case the tele-
phone company-does not play any role whatsoever in content.
2. United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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Now, let's say that the notion of a natural monopoly is falling
by the wayside. For example, in long-distance, there is in this
country some four hundred long-distance companies, so it's pretty
hard to argue that long-distance is a natural monopoly. Neverthe-
less, the common carrier model still holds true. So, for example,
in a real close-to-home experience for me, when the Alabama At-
torney General in 1993 tried to indict Sprint for violations of the
state obscenity statute3 because of the content of phone messages
by our customer, we went into federal court and got that indictment
enjoined.4 That is because we did not have a choice; we had to
provide the service in question. The FCC still thinks of telephone
companies and long-distance companies in the common carrier
model. For example, there's the debate before Congress
now 5and it went before the FCC a couple of years ago 6 -about
which is the appropriate role of telephone companies in providing
cable services. The FCC opted for what's known as "video dial
tone," which is basically that the telco can put in the transmission
facility but must offer it to all comers on a non-discriminatory
basis and cannot attempt to influence the content. So that's the
common carrier model.
The "broadcast model" is probably one that you're very famil-
iar with.7 The notion there is that the FCC regulates uses of the
radio-frequency spectrum. There's a very limited spectrum out
there for things like radio and television, cellular, PCS and so forth,
so there's a very tight regulation of who gets access to what and
the terms and conditions under which you get access.
In the broadcast model, the FCC or Congress could have easily
gone with the common carrier notion-which is, have the TV sta-
tion or the radio station be indifferent as to content and just serve
3. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-200.1 to .10 (1989).
4. See Sprint Corp. v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1447 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
5. See H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 25-39 (1993) (allowing telephone companies
to provide video programming in their telephone service areas subject to strict structural
separation requirements and a requirement to provide up to 75 percent of system capacity
to unaffiliated video program providers).
6. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second
Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992).
7. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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as a transmitter. They could have done that, or they could have
adopted some notion of rotating among potential users and giving
more people access, but they didn't. What they decided to do was
give somebody a limited license, subject to renewal, and then use
that frequency as a trustee for the public because there wasn't
enough to go around for everyone.' So that's sometimes known as
the "trustee model." And in that model, the government does play
some role in content regulation and it does so through the renewal
process. Basically, the station owner needs to show that they've
served the public interest by putting on informational programs,
educational programs-things like that. The government is not
involved in viewpoint regulation but wants to make sure that
there's that diversity of sources.
Finally, we get to some of the hybrid models, and cable is
probably a good hybrid model. Cable has elements of all three.
There's the notion of unregulated speech. As you know, for the
most part, cable companies have freedom to put whatever program
they want to on it. Now, I'm sure we'll get differences of opinion
of just how much government intrusion there is and the appropri-
ateness of that intrusion. But the government does require "must
carry," which basically says that because you have a lot of channel
capacity and because you have a "natural monopoly"-that is,
you're the only provider of cable services into a home-we're
going to impose on you certain obligations to carry certain types
of programs.9 And there'll be a lot of discussion on that today.
The notion there was, again, to encourage diversity of sources,
requiring that the public be given access to government public
policy, education, and community programming.
There's probably been a lot of criticism of the cable model. In
fact, of any model out there in terms of achieving the desired result
of diverse and antagonistic sources, the cable model has probably
come under the most criticism. That is because today cable is
8. See Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
9. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535
(Supp. IV 1992)).
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largely a monopoly, and because it passes into so many homes, its
influence is very large. The cable companies are vertically-inte-
grated companies-they have financial interests in the pro-
grams-and there have been allegations in hearings before Con-
gress that the cable companies have used anticompetitive practic-
es. ° That's why Congress adopted the "must carry" rules. But
anyway, these are the three models-I'm sorry, the three models
plus the one hybrid.
So what does this mean in terms of the future? I personally
think the common carrier models serve the public well. I think it's
a good thing that people be able to use their telephone for whatever
purpose they want to. I don't think the Alabama Attorney General
should be able to say that "adult content" cannot be discussed or
transmitted over the telephone. I think the Alabama Attorney Gen-
eral should not-and cannot-ask the telephone companies to regu-
late content, and that was really the issue in that case. So I think
the common carrier model has worked. I'm not sure if it works in
the future. We've got a conflict with the cable model and the
common carrier model, and increasingly we're competing head-to-
head. As Jim mentioned with technology developments, if it's not
ready now, within a short number of years it will be possible to
provide the exact same communications content over the wire that
comes in from the cable companies and over the broadband facility
that comes in from the telephone company. Either will be techno-
logically able to meet a customer's total communications needs.
The vision is that you will have a "smart-box" over your TV,
in which you can access all forms of communications-not just
video. The historically bright line between cable, which is video,
and telephone, which is voice-those days will soon be over.
While I think the common carrier model has served us well, I
don't think it's possible to have two people competing head-to-
head for the same customer and being regulated differently. I just
10. See, e.g., Media Ownership: Diversity and Concentration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see also S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133.
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don't think that works. I don't have a great answer. I can tell you
where I think public policy is going. Public policy is going toward
letting telephone companies provide cable service-it's letting
cable companies provide telephone service. That is, the state and
federal restrictions-largely state restrictions-would be preempted,
and cable companies could provide telephone service, thus allowing
head-to-head competition. But right now, the notion still is the
telephone companies must function as a common carrier. Maybe
you could make the argument, Jim? Should we stop?
PROFESSOR GOODALE: If you want to. I think we've got
a bridge on which to come back. I think we've raised the key
issue for this panel and I thought it was an excellent, clear presen-
tation on items that I find very difficult to explain to other people
as clearly as you have.
But as I was saying, I think that presenting the issue you have
as to whether the common carrier model will work in the future is
a nice way to turn this over to Ted. Not that he's necessarily go-
ing to answer that question, but implicit in any bill that the Clinton
administration comes up with or Congress comes up with will be
an answer to the question posed-whether common carrier regula-
tion is appropriate as we go forward. And I will say just before
Ted speaks that, he really has the most difficult assignment of all,
because we've asked him to explain to us what the Clinton "posi-
tion" or the Gore "position" is on this subject, and very candidly,
it's very difficult to figure out with any particularity what the
Clinton administration position is. And I think that's intentional,
because it would be my view anyway-and I'm trying to make it
a little easier here for my next speaker-that the Clinton adminis-
tration would like to see some of the thinking develop in Congress.
Anyway, I don't want to take everything away from Ted Hirt, and
you're on.
MR. HIRT: Thank you. I want to express my thanks, first of
all, to the Law School and to the Journal for all of us being given
the opportunity to speak here today, from both myself and my
colleagues from the Department of Justice. My first caveat is that
what I am going to say does not purport to be official Department
of Justice policy or, for that matter, administration policy, so the
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views that I and my colleagues from the Department who follow
me express are really our own and should not be taken to be offi-
cial policy. They may or may not be coincident with such policy.
That probably gets me off the hook to some extent from Professor
Goodale's question to me as to whether I can state the Clinton
administration position. I'm not trying to do so, since I'm not a
legislative representative from the administration. However, my
goal in this brief time period is to try and explain what I think are
the operating principles that the administration has endorsed, talk
just for a few minutes about some of the bills that are already be-
fore Congress, and give you a little insight as to those provisions.
First of all, there is to my knowledge no "administration bill."
There has been, however, testimony by administration representa-
tives, some of which is in your materials. Most recently, during
the last week of January, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Larry
Irving testified" on the two pending bills from the House side
which are H.R. 362612 and H.R. 3636.13 The nomenclature of the
bills is enough to confuse one right there, to make sure we know
which topics are at issue. However, I think that the starting point,
before I get to the "nuts and bolts" of regulation or to what Rich
Devlin is talking about-what model might ultimately be embraced
by a legislative solution-is to talk very briefly about the princi-
ples, because the administration has been quite clear in both of the
speeches by the Vice President-the December speech 14 and the
January speech 5-both of which are in your materials, that any
proposal in the telecommunications field should be guided by some
11. Hearings on H.R. 3626 Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 3626] (testimony of Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce), available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Script File;
Hearings on H.R. 3636 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on H.R. 3636] (testimony of Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Communications
and Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce), available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Script File.
12. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
13. H.R. 3636, supra note 5.
14. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the National Press Club (Dec. 21, 1993)
(transcript available from the Office of the Vice President, The White House).
15. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks to the Superhighway Summit (Jan. 11, 1994).
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overriding principles. I think that they are consistent with the First
Amendment model that Mr. Devlin identified, including his citation
from Associated Press.
These overriding principles are as follows. First of all, encour-
aging private investment in the national information infrastructure,
also known as the information superhighway. Second, promoting
and protecting competition. Third, the concept of open access to
the telecommunications field by not only the ultimate consum-
er-the telephone subscriber and the cable subscriber-but also by
those who wish to connect or interconnect with the existing tele-
communications network. So the principle of open access is very
important.
The administration also has as a goal promoting and, indeed,
enhancing the concept of universal access. As I first read this, I
said to myself, well, what they're trying to say is that everyone has
a telephone, and that's what 94 percent of the country's households
should continue to have if they want a simple telephone, if they
don't want necessarily to go for something more sophisticated.
However, as I've read the administration's positions-and this is
in some of the testimony in your materials-it's clear to me that
the administration is looking more broadly, to the extent that the
premise of the information superhighway should be that consum-
ers-whether we're talking about students, the elderly, or other
segments of the population-should benefit from all of the en-
hancements that these respective industries are going to present to
us in the near future. So it's not simply a question of preserving,
if you will, the status quo of telephone service, but also enhancing
that with all of these products and services that the industries are
coming up with.
The final principle-and this gets us to some extent to the leg-
islative solution or, if you will, the legislative conundrum-is flexi-
bility. The administration, as reflected in the White Paper, 16 the
fact sheets, and the Vice President's speeches, wants to emphasize
flexibility. I think from what has already been said to you by the
16. Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reforms, 66 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 156 (Feb. 3, 1994) [hereinafter White Paper].
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panel-and what you'll hear the balance of the day-is that we're
all facing, as we've said, a revolution, and the concern is that a
legislative solution, if it becomes too rigid, will actually not meet
what goes on in the marketplace or react to it. So I think that the
administration testimony indicates that they would want there to
reside, somewhere, a fair amount of flexibility to deal with issues.
I don't want-in the limited time I have-to go through each
of the bills laboriously because they are in your materials, but I
think that the principles, if you will, that the administration has
endorsed are evident in the bills. The caveat that I have to add-if
I haven't said it before-is that we may well see the administration
work with Congress from existing bills or we may well see the
administration have its own bills that work from the bedrock prin-
ciples of the two bills. I, in part because I'm not a legislative
policy person, could not tell you, nor would I be authorized to try
to predict that.
This is clearly a rapidly moving issue, and in the legislative
process, one just has to see how it evolves. But if you look at the
bills-and H.R. 3636 is a good example-it represents some of the
same principles that we've talked about. Equal access is a big
principle to anyone who wants to provide so-called information
services or competing telecommunications service. Section 102,
for instance, says that it would be a duty of a Title II common
carrier to furnish such service and also to do it in an "unbundled"
way, and as I understand it, it means that if you're going to offer
a service, it should be a distinct service, so that people-whether
you're talking about the telephone subscriber or someone who
seeks access to the system-will pay for, or transact for, a specific
service and not other services.17
Another issue-which goes back to the common carrier mod-
el-is raised by the Markey-Fields bill,18 which is whether the FCC
would regulate these new common carrier access systems through
a tariff-type system, in which case there would be rates filed which
17. See H.R. 3636, supra note 5, at 5-7.
18. H.R. 3636 was co-sponsored by Rep. Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Fields (R-
Tex.).
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the FCC could review.19
An important issue which will be the subject of the third panel
is the entry of the telephone companies into the cable field. Here
I think is where you will see, as the next panels will tell us, the
debate that becomes very concrete over allowing industries to
merge or cooperate. One of the big issues is, if a telephone com-
pany is allowed entry into the cable business, to what extent should
it be able to do so directly or, as the Markey-Fields bill suggests,
through some sort of separate affiliate? 20
As I understand the administration's views of this type of bill,
they would endorse that aspect of having a separate affiliate for the
cable company-by that I mean the telephone-cable company oper-
ation. There would be a question, however, from the administra-
tion standpoint about to what extent to put that in the statutory
language-the exact restrictions of that affiliate. In other words,
do you want to have a very structured affiliate and regulate each
of the transactions between the telephone company parent and the
affiliate, or do you want to leave that to FCC regulation? And that
can include marketing of the new business-the cable business.
That can include making sure there are no cross-subsidies, so that
the telephone rate-payers do not bear the cost of this new cable-
telephone feature-again going back to the theory that one is pre-
serving the notion that a telephone rate-payer can still pay only for
the telephone service, if that is the household's choice.
I think that the emerging debate is to some extent whether the
administration will want to reside in the discretion of the agen-
cy-the FCC-much of the "nuts and bolts" or the implementation
of how an affiliate might operate.
Another good example-to address the competition issue-is
the extent to which the bill would restrict a telephone company
from purchasing an existing cable operation-in other words, im-
posing a five-year moratorium. 2' Is that a good idea? The admin-
istration might say, maybe we should let the FCC look at the issue.
19. See H.R. 3636, supra note 5, at 10-12.
20. See id. at 25-34.
21. See id. at 32.
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As you know, there already are, in much of the telecommunications
industry, regulations which contain waiver provisions. To the ex-
tent we go back to the other principle that I talked about-that of
competition-if we are trying to create this national information
infrastructure, we want to look at the question of competition: Is
there competition in a marketplace? If there is, maybe restrictions
are not necessary. If there is no competition, we should have to
ask whether the consumer should be protected in terms of there
being only one provider of this type of communications service.
Just very quickly on H.R. 3626. This comes back to the issue
which Mr. Devlin has talked about, of more competition in the
telephone business, in terms of access-whether you're talking
about long-distance access or local access-and I would refer you
to the bill. Again, to some extent, what I think we might see-and
this goes to the convergence theory-is the idea of the so-called
"level playing field." In other words, we could be looking at these
two businesses, if you will, merging. There is concern, I'm sure,
that there be a symmetrical regulatory treatment of whatever the
function or business is.
Which brings me to my final point on what we might see from
the administration proposal. Again, Assistant Secretary Irving
emphasized that what might emerge is a new Title VII to the Com-
munications Act and I will try to quote from a paper that came out
that's not in your materials-"a new Title VII would provide a uni-
fied symmetric treatment of providers of two-way broadband ser-
vices in contrast to the present disparate treatment of common
carriers and cable operators under Titles II and VI of the Act.",
22
So this is something that may well be fleshed out-should there be
a brand new model, in a sense, a dynamic model, that will allow
for an option to look at a whole new way of treating the converg-
ing businesses?
Whatever emerges, we'll have to keep in mind the five prin-
ciples that I spoke about earlier, and we'll have to see how this
session of Congress sees those being manifested in the actual bill
22. White Paper, supra note 16, at 159.
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that might emerge. Thank you.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Thanks very much. That gives us
some basis for coming back and talking about the various issues
with respect to those bills. But before doing this, Andy Merdek
has volunteered to answer the sixty-four dollar question, which no
one yet has been able to answer who has thought about it, as to
what is the proper-appropriate, I guess, is what that means-First
Amendment standard to apply to the converging media entities.
We await your views breathlessly.
MR. MERDEK: And they probably will be delivered breath-
lessly. I want to thank the Law School for putting on this program
and I want to thank Jim Goodale for chairing this panel. Jim and
I both have newspaper backgrounds, and he's always been one of
my heroes.
He started out by telling you this is a confusing subject. Then
Rich Devlin and Ted Hirt very quickly gave us very simple and
even well-organized presentations-three First Amendment models
and five points under the two statutes in draft form. So I fear it's
up to me to uphold the obligation to confuse you because this is
confusing, and I think I need to do that.
This would be a simple business were it simply an economic
issue as to how you get from the current separate technologies of
cable and telephone to the merged technology of what, in essence,
would be two-way interactive, broadband, digital-switched commu-
nications. That's quite a mouthful.
The reason it isn't a simple business is that it's not just an
economic issue for two reasons. Number one, Congress has a role
in it, and ultimately when Congress has a role in things, it often
creates entities that have roles, like the FCC. Back when I was a
newspaper reporter, we used to have a sign that said, "No man's
life, liberty or property is safe when Congress is in session," and
I think they're proving that. The other reason is because there's
this hundreds-of-years-old thing called the First Amendment, which
actually confers some rights and obligations on people and limits
the activities of government. Yet here we are trying to figure out
what the role of government is going to be.
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What are they going to be looking at? Well, the mouthful I
said before-two-way, interactive, broadband, digital-switched
communications. "Two-way." That part of it is easy, right? You
send it out, something else comes back. "Interactive." You can
manipulate the system, you can send information into it rather than
just receiving it as you do with a television signal now. "Broad-
band." I guess the hot buzz-word for it is 500-channel; it may be
more than that by the time it ultimately gets built-it may be
less-but there are going to be a lot of choices in the video world.
"Digital." The signals are going to be sent through electronic l's
and 0's-a digital, multiplexed system which makes a lot of things
possible, like maybe encrypting some things so that you have some
privacy. That becomes important because it's switched like a tele-
phone system-you can call Rich Devlin, you can call Ted Hirt,
you don't have to call the world and hope no one else will see it.
If any of you has-Prodigy or CompuServe or any of those other
computer networks now, imagine that technology being merged
with and superimposed on your television and then merged with
your telephone, so that someday-assuming that either the couple
of hundred year-old First Amendment doesn't get in the way, or
Congress and the FCC don't get in the way-you will have "The
Box," in fact probably two of them, one at home and one on your
wrist or your belt, which will be a combination telephone-comput-
er-television-you name it-one electronic full-service communica-
tor.
Now to the issue Jim has charged me with responding to-the
First Amendment. Rich was nice enough to tell us there are basi-
cally three flavors of it, and since you didn't look confused
enough, I wanted to suggest that there are at least six. But before
I do that, I have .to tell you where I'm coming from, because work-
ing for Cox, which is a privately-held company some of you may
not be familiar with, we have at least five viewpoints on this. Just
as Ted was saying, the federal government has its own policy, but
what he says doesn't necessarily reflect that. In fact, these days I
wonder if what anybody says, including Al Gore, necessarily re-
flects the policy of the federal government. .Let me tell you where
Cox is coming from.
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Cox is a newspaper, broadcast, cable, automobile auction, and
other things company. They have television, radio-basic broad-
cast properties-which, in the context of the First Amendment
issue, puts us under Rich's broadcast model. We're licensees of
the public airwaves because of the limited spectrum, and therefore
we're subject to renewal and sanctions and fines and what have
you.
In the Turner case,23 which the next panel is going to talk
about, you'll recall that the broadcasters basically said the "must
carry" rules that require that cable systems carry local broadcasters
are a great thing for broadcasters. They therefore deserve a very
low level of constitutional scrutiny and, gee-whiz, we need all the
protection we can get from these malicious and monopolistic cable
people.
Cox also has cable interests. So at the other end of the hall,
we've got people who say "must carry" is terrible, it deserves the
strictest First Amendment scrutiny. It's basically a government
preference for certain speakers and voices over others, stifling the
right to choose-if you're a cable guy-carriage of more popular
signals. Then we could charge people more since we're selling this
stuff, but now we've got to put on some local stations that people
may not really care about.
Cox is also an innovator in Teleport, as Jim mentioned, which
is basically an alternate access telephone company where you take
the fiber-optic stuff in the high-tech cable systems and turn it into
a telephone system that lets people bypass the local phone com-
pany in order to get to Sprint or AT&T or MCI.
Cox also is part of the great convergence, as Jim mentioned,
because we've got deals with Southwestern Bell here in the United
States and in the United Kingdom to provide expanded cable opera-
tions here and ultimately cable and telephone over the same wire
in England.
And then finally, Cox was one of the first-and, in fact, has
23. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.), cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
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what's called a pioneer preference from the FCC-in this new PCS
technology, personal communications systems.
As a result, I just want you to understand that if at any point in
this presentation I contradict myself, it's because all I'm doing is
basically juxtaposing one Cox viewpoint with another. Anyway,
my job as Cox's vice president of Legal Affairs is, of course, to try
to keep all this stuff straight. But that will not get in the way of
confusing you.
Let us now turn to the First Amendment and try to do that. Let
me suggest that there are at least six First Amendments. There are
seven if you count the one that Hugo Black used on the Supreme
Court: when the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of the press, ' ' 24 then that means no
law. Nobody took him up on that.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Douglas did.26
MR. MERDEK: Well that's true, Justice Douglas did.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: A voice in the wilderness.
MR. MERDEK: Douglas knew more about the wilderness than
anybody, but this is ultimately a kind of Goldilocks-and-the-por-
ridge question: what's too strong, what's too weak, what's too hot,
what's too cold-and you've got to get something that's just right.
Let me suggest that there are a bunch of these First Amend-
ments to play with and I'm going to go through them quickly. The
next panel on the Turner case will probably tell you more about
how it all played out in the context 'of "must carry," but some-
body-not me-did a count: in the Turner case there apparently
are 22 substantive briefs, from 49 different groups, with 126 attor-
neys of record, 27 taking the position that, at least as to ,"must car-
ry," the proper First Amendment standard is either strict scrutiny
like the print model, some mixed intermediate standard, typically
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring).
26. See id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 34-35.
682 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
referred to as the O'Brien test28-which I'll get to--or something
like that, or even all the way down to rational basis, meaning if
there's really any conceivable reason for the government doing this,
you may as well uphold it. If that many lawyers and that many
companies can fight in that many briefs over the issue, there's got
to be at least six to choose from.
The first one, as Rich mentioned, is the print model, which we
often refer to as pure speech, and cable wraps itself in that flag all
the time. The cable system works largely by virtue of its franchise
grant from the local licensing authorities, provides multiple video
signals to your television set, and likes to think of itself as an edi-
tor. We choose what signals we're going to send, so therefore,
we're an editor; we're the same as the guy who runs the New York
Times, deciding what story to put in every day or what wire service
to carry. If you start from that premise, you can strike down "must
carry" in a hurry-and you can strike down just about anything
else-because the one central rule of pure speech or print model is
that the government almost never wins. If you've got the
Brandenburg29 clear and present danger of inciting violence, or the
Chaplinsky30 fighting words, or maybe something real close to that,
then maybe the government can have some limited regulatory role,
but otherwise you almost get to the Hugo Black and Bill Douglas
version of the "no law" First Amendment.
There was some interest in this view in the oral argument on
Turner with Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and even Chief
Justice Rehnquist reportedly suggesting that maybe there is some
editorial choice going on here and that the government's rights to
regulate it are pretty limited, because ultimately it's information
28. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Supreme
Court formulated an intermediate standard of analyzing regulations that purported to
impinge upon freedom of speech. This intermediate standard falls between the strict
scrutiny approach and the "mere rationality" test. Under O'Brien, a regulation will be
upheld if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the supression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
29. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
30. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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being chosen and certain speakers being preferred based on what
information they want to confer. 3' But there was also a bit of a
broader view with Justice Souter and Justice Ginsberg talking about
entrepreneurial rather than editorial decisions and musing over
whether maybe this wire that goes into your home really is a lot
like the other wire which provides telephone, as opposed to being
like the newspaper which gets delivered by second century B.C.
technology: we throw one at your front door. Anyway, if you
start from that model of pure speech, the government can't do
much of anything.
The next step takes us down one notch to the broadcast model
which, you'll recall, largely got its fuel from the Red Lion deci-
32sion, where the Supreme Court announced that broadcasters are
just trustees of the public airwaves, and have a limited right to do
anything, so that there can be permissible incursions on their right
to choose content. This is, in some ways, an economically corrupt
notion, because even though its premise is that the electromagnetic
spectrum is scarce, or limited, or at least finite, which it is, from
an economic standpoint this scarce spectrum in your average city
probably produces about twelve TV stations and thirty radio sta-
tions, whereas in the unlimited world-unless you think there's a
finite number of trees out there to make paper for newspapers
from-there's one newspaper. It's kind of hard to talk about
what's scarce with a straight face when you have forty or fifty
electromagnetic spectrum users providing electronic signals full of
content to you and only one newspaper.
It's also a little bit disingenuous to talk about it because, as Ted
was suggesting, one of the things the government does is allocate
the spectrum, which gives it control over who gets what. It has
allocated spectrum since the Federal Radio Act in 1927,33 which
31. See Linda Greenhouse, New Law Regulating Cable TV Gets Skeptical Response
From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at A12; Joan Biskupic, Court Weighs
Regulation of Cable TV; Question Confronted For the First Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 13,
1994, at A15.
32. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
33. Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed
by Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current ver-
684 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
was largely passed to avoid a Tower of Babel with everybody
broadcasting on the same, most desirable, frequencies and nobody
being able to receive anything. As you read in the New York
Times this morning, the government now is re-allocating spectrum,
designating some for PCS, and taking some away from the U.S.
Department of Defense to give to commercial, entrepreneurial use.34
So it may be finite, but it's flexible. That's that for the broadcast
model.
There's a third model which I guess is based on economic scar-
city or wire scarcity, which supports public utility regulations and
local cable franchise regulation. This was the model that the FCC
had looked at for common carriers, and it did try to pass "must
carry" rules a couple of times before the Court struck them down.35
The reviewing courts said we can look behind what you're do-
ing-you're the FCC, not Congress-and we'll look very closely,
and the record doesn't support it.
If you look closely at that standard, though-and I'm going to
get to it as the O'Brien test in a second-it is an intermediate level
of constitutional scrutiny which is favored for many reasons, proba-
bly not the least of which is its flexibility. This has typically been
applied to cable, if you look at cases like Leathers v. Medlock,36
which is basically a taxation case, or the Bell Atlantic C & P Tele-
phone case,37 which was a successful challenge to a ban on a tele-
phone company's owning cable in its own service area, which had
been prohibited by the 1984 Cable Act.38 The courts tossed out the
notion of using Red Lion broadcasting standards and said we're
going to use the O'Brien standard, and they applied it and struck
sion at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
34. See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Seeks to Expand Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1994, at DI.
35. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
36. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
37. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993).
38. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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the stuff down.
There's a very similar test, and we'll call it the fourth First
Amendment, which is in essence quarantine or locational speech
regulation. If you read cases like Central Hudson39 or cases in-
volving labor picketing4° or zoning cases involving adult entertain-
ment,41 where you have some speakers that want to speak but other
people who are bothered by the proximity of speech, much less the
content of it, that typically gets an intermediate level of scrutiny
too, although it's slightly different from O 'Brien. The O'Brien test
basically says that you'll uphold regulations that further a "substan-
tial" (magic word) government interest, and the restriction itself is
"no greater than essential" (also magic words) to further that inter-
est, whereas with the quarantine or locational speech issue, instead
of substantial, they talk about "compelling" state interest, and in-
stead of no greater than essential, they talk about "narrowly tai-
lored." I'm not really sure what the difference between any of
these are, substantial and compelling-somebody sitting in the back
of the room with a gun is probably a substantial reason for me to
turn over my wallet. Jim sitting next to me with a gun is probably
a compelling reason. I'm not sure where you draw that distinction
when it comes to cable and telco.
Then you've got a couple of lesser First Amendment stan-
dards--or at least we always believed they were lesser until recent-
ly. The commercial speech test really blossomed in the Virginia
Board of Pharmacy case 42 it addresses speech which largely is
commercial in the sense that it proposes transactions, it wants to
sell you things, advertising. It's not commercial just because
somebody is making money somewhere; it's commercial because
of the subject matter. And that was frequently held not to get
anywhere near the protection as other speech. But that may be
39. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
40. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
42. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
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changing too: there was a Supreme Court case called Discovery,43
in which the City of Cincinnati was trying to regulate news racks
on the street, and they decided that shoppers-just little tabloids,
handout-type of things that have nothing but shopping information
in them-shouldn't have as much right to be on the street as real
newspapers. The Supreme Court sort of said a rack is a rack, and
this is speech too. Someone was telling me, although I wasn't
there at the oral argument, that one justice, I think it was Justice
Scalia, asked one of the advocates if he really can say that more
people care about how many people got killed in Bosnia yesterday
than they do about when the Bloomingdale's half-price sale is.
Maybe there is more value in local commercial speech than in pure
speech for some people. But that typically gets a lower level of
constitutional protection.
And then finally at the fringes of all this, you've got obscene
speech, which is largely held to be not speech at all-it's just sexu-
al references that appeal to your prurient interest and offend con-
temporary community standards," and the Supreme Court can't
really define it too much better than that, other than to say they
"know it when they see it."
45
Anyway, if you've got to pick a test to apply to all of this con-
vergence, my favorite one to pick for many reasons is the O 'Brien
test, largely because it's so fuzzy. You get to define interests and
then apply them. Here's the individual or economic interest of the
speaker, here's the interest of the government, now let's define
them. We'll see how they were defined in legislative histories, and
what have you, or FCC comment records, and then we'll weigh
them against the private interests.
So you pick a government interest and you pick a private inter-
est and you weigh them and you balance them and you decide if
they're "substantial" or "compelling" or whatever the word of the
day is. Some of these interests are, in fact, tightly defined, like in
the preambles of statutes. For example, in the 1992 Cable
43. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
44. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
45. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Act-which is what the whole "must carry" case comes up un-
der-Congress makes findings that this is an economically disjoint-
ed area, and that there has been abusive competitive behavior, and
that they need to do something about it.46 Some of this is part of
the FCC's own record when they do notice and comment
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.47 They say,
here's what we plan to do: you've got X number of days to give
us your comments, your comments go into the record, then we
analyze them and we make a decision which has to be supported
by what's in the record.
Some of the interests really come out of the judge's back-
pockets in some ways, so there are some strange cases out there in
the First Amendment landscape. There was a case called WNCN
Listeners Guild,48 which involved radio broadcasting and what was
a "format," because the FCC at one point thought that certain for-
mats had to be preserved under the public interest, convenience and
necessity, and it was judicially determined that classical music was
a format such that there was a public-interest issue raised if some-
body wanted to change from being a classical music station to
being, say, an all rap station. So that was suddenly a government
interest.
And then there are some non-articulated interests. As we all
know and you all probably heard, bad facts make bad law. There
are lots of things out there that are, in fact, interests-some of
them economic, some of them political. People do, at least to the
extent that Buckley v. Valeo49 lets you, contribute to political cam-
paigns, and the people in Congress-to be just a little cynical about
all these statutes-probably do have some constituencies other than
the people who just vote for them. John Tower used to be called
the Senator from Exxon. There are lots of pressures on these peo-
ple to make the laws and to set the standards and to make the deci-
46. See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 1460-63 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
521 (Supp. IV 1992)).
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
48. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that spending limits in political campaigns violated
candidates' freedom of speech).
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sions. If you read through the hundreds of years of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence and other constitutional jurisprudence, you'll
see that these interests kind of creep into things. Go back and read
the Dred Scott decision, ° or Plessy v. Ferguson,5' where interests
like the concept of slavery and human beings as property are up-
held; there were some interests going on back then that I'd venture
to say are a lot different from what they are now.
Anyway, if you're going to take the O'Brien test-because it's
the fuzziest and most flexible-you're going to have to define
some of those interests, and there are some limitations on what you
can do. In addition to the interests that Congress and the FCC and
everybody else has articulated, you've got to keep a straight face,
by which I mean you've got to do something that will withstand
some level of scrutiny. You've got to do a little bit more than
Jeremy Bentham did when he articulated the theory of utilitarian-
ism where just about anything is good so long as there's no corre-
sponding bad.52 That, incidentally, is now back as something
called "pareto economics,"53 if any of you are economic majors.
Bentham utilitarianism is alive and well and relative value analysis
of what's good, what's bad, and what's neutral is a game that not
just judges, but economists and many other people-many of
whom are paid to be experts in these individual cable-telco kind of
cases-like to play.
And then finally you've got limitations of language. Whether
you're into Lewis Carroll and notions of the Cheshire cat telling
you that words mean what we want them to mean, or if you've
ever taking a philosophy of language course, there are wonderful
philosopholinguistic (if that's a word) tracts as to how one defines
things and measures and values things. Ziff or Quine will tell you
50. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks were
not "citizens" within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution).
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the "separate but equal" doctrine of Southern
"Jim Crow" laws which mandated segregation).
52. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Byrnes & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
53. See generally W.J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN
LOCAL TELEPHONY (M.I.T. Press 1994).
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that, for example, if you're defining the word "good," the charac-
teristics of a good stalk of asparagus are significantly different
from the characteristics of a good basketball.54 They're both good
but what makes each good is very different. Assigning
words-nouns-to objects can be enormously complex, and all the
more so for governmental interests.
You can play the game if you want as a strict constitutional,
legal, regulatory, economic, serious exercise, or you can be a little
cynical. Underneath all of this are the economic interests, and
they're enormous. The concentration of wealth in the Baby Bells
is massive. We talked a little bit at the beginning about the phone
companies contributing cash. They contribute a lot more than
that-like switching expertise-but boy, do they contribute cash.
The multiples, the prices that they pay-the proposed Bell Atlantic-
TCI deal is an example-billions and billions, as Carl Sagan says,
of dollars, and readily available. It had to come from somewhere,
and since they don't grow these dollars, chances are they came
from people paying their phone bills over the years. Stuff gets into
the rate base, it gets regulated, there's a rate of return on it and
somehow they end up with the billions and billions of dollars to
spend on buying cable companies. That's great if you're a cable
company. We're real glad to be in that position.
These are ultimately economic interests. When you watch a
case like the "must carry" Turner case in front of the Supreme
Court, and you see very serious lawyers making serious constitu-
tional arguments about which standard-O'Brien, rational basis,
strict scrutiny, what have you-and how it's applied and what the
interests are, you can't help but also think that there are billions
and billions and billions of dollars behind this and riding on it.
When you look at the hearings where Larry Irving of the Com-
merce Department55 and Reed Hundt of the FCC5 6 and Anne
54. See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (M.I.T. Press 1960).
55. See Hearings on H.R. 3626, supra note 11 (testimony of Larry Irving, Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce); Hearings on
H.R. 3636, supra note 11 (testimony of Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Communica-
tions and Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
56. Hearings on H.R. 3626 & 3636 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
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Bingaman from the Antitrust Division57 tell Congressman Markey
why they want two wires rather than one, and how they see two
different companies' broadband, interactive, digital-switched, etcet-
era, competing with each other, you can see a bunch of people in
major industries and corporations-some public, some private-
licking their economic chops and saying, yeah, that's great, because
there are billions and billions of dollars in it for us.
The point I want to make-and I'm not being entirely cynical
by talking about billions and billions of dollars-is this: with the
economic interests being so massive, there is a tremendous tempta-
tion-regardless of which analytical model we pick and how we
apply it-for a court to go back to some really terribly discredited
jurisprudence. You probably learned in the first year of law school
about Lochner v. New York 58-the notion of substantive due pro-
cess-where for a while the Court wanted to substitute its econom-
ic judgment for that of lawmakers. To some extent, whichever
tests you pick should be chosen and applied in a way that makes
some sense for a participatory democracy. The real First Amend-
ment goal is to have the most diverse speakers, so that the market-
place of ideas can be as full of things as you can imagine. If that
doesn't happen, what you ultimately may have is the kind of
Lochner v. New York notion where somebody's economic judgment
gets substituted-and that's a scary thought. That's something we
all hope doesn't happen.
I want to mention a couple of other things-just to put a little
more context on this decision-although they're not purely consti-
tutional. They are from a different context, but nonetheless I think
they're important to consider. One of them is the regulatory mod-
els. Both Rich and Ted were alluding to the fact that there is, in
fact, a well developed scheme of regulation, not just at the federal
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994)
(testimony of Reed Hundt, Chairman, FCC), available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Script
File.
57. See Hearings on H.R. 3626, supra note 11 (testimony of Anne Bingaman, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York law which limited the hours
employees could work in bakeries violated due process).
[Vol. 4:663
1994] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON NEW MEDIA ALLIANCES 691
government through the FCC, which compartmentalizes things in
its own way-Title II is common carriers and Title VI6 is cable,
and if there's going to be an Al Gore Title VII, it'll be a kind of
fast-track superhighway-but there's a lot of state regulation, pub-
lic service commissions, which the telcos put up with every day.
Then there's local regulation because cable basically gets fran-
chised at the local level. So you've got three layers of formal
regulatory stuff to get through before you have the right to do
much of anything in this business. You also have a fourth layer,
too, but it's informal and that's the raised-eyebrow regulation. It
comes up from time to time-the most recent incarnation being
over cable and broadcast industries which, after a certain amount
of hand-wringing and finger-pointing, decide that they would try to
develop a way to self-regulate to avoid anyone else regulating them
as to the violence content of television.6' You've seen it before
where MTV moved "Beavis and Butthead" from one time period
to another after some little kid set fire to something after having
seen Beavis and Butthead do that.62 You've seen the movie The
Program get re-cut because it had a scene where somebody is lying
in the road, and somebody goes out, tries that and gets killed.63
You saw it to a lesser extent when Tipper Gore-who may or may
not be part of the driving force behind this Title VII superhighway
with her husband-made it her cause celebre years ago to put pa-
rental advisory warnings on rock music. 64 There's a certain amount
of this informal raised-eyebrow type of regulation that will also be
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-228 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
60. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
61. See Edmund Andrews, Cable Industry Endorses Ratings and Devices to Lock Out
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al; Cable's Self-Check on Violence, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 1994, at A20.
62. See Stephen Williams, Feedback on MTV's Controversial Cartoon, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 17, 1993, at 63; Jim DeBross, Did Show Cost Girl's Life?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST.,
Oct. 31, 1993, at D8.
63. See Caryn James, If Simon Says "Lie Down in the Road," Should You?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 4, at 2; Disney Plans to Omit Film Scene After Teenager Dies
Imitating It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at A20.
64. See Richard Harrington, Accord on Lyrics Labeling; Firms, Parents Agree to 2
Warning Options, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1985, at HI; Congress All Shook Up Over Rock
Lyrics, BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1985, at 28.
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with us along with the billions and billions of dollars of economic
interest behind it.
And then there is the little bit of historical context-looking
forward and looking back-that you've got to put all this in. Right
now, you look at a regulatory legislative model that's really been
around since the Federal Radio Act of 1927 and apply it to tele-
phone service, which has been around for a hundred years or so,
and to television, which has been around for fifty years or so, but
as you look forward, some new things are coming. One of them
is direct broadcast satellites ("DBS"), and by sometime this
year-supposedly in April but who knows--cable is going to have
a competitor, albeit not interactive in two-way, but just in cable
program delivery-from at least two, and eventually maybe as
many as four or five, direct broadcast satellite companies. You put
a very small dish in your window, your yard, your roof, and you
get this stuff direct to your TV, without the wire at all. And if
that's all you want-if you see TV as something to stimulate the
alpha-waves in your brain and you don't want to interact with it,
you just want to watch it-then that's a perfectly good substitute
for all of this wire, regulated, coaxial, fiber stuff.
Finally, there's a joker in the deck in the sense that if you need
fiber optics, which is a better wire, if you will, than coaxial cable,
which is in turn a better wire, if you will, than the so-called twisted
pair the phone company largely has, there's other fiber optic out
there. For example, your electrical company, your gas company,
and other public utilities that are regulated for other purposes could
cost-justify and have laid a bunch of fiber, with intentions to use
it for their own purposes, for example, to read your meter. Why
send somebody driving around the neighborhood to read your meter
if you can just do a fiber two-way line to see how much electricity
you're using? If they've laid enough fiber so that they can offer
to deliver fifty to one hundred TV programs on it, at some point
they may try that. Rich's point, which I thought was a very good
one, is that if you have different people competing to deliver the
same thing, you've got a certain amount of incongruence if they're
suffering under different regulatory schemes. Here is yet another
provider that has yet the same fiber technology out there that may
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be under a totally different regulatory scheme, being looked at by
a public utilities commission as a gas company or an electrical
company, but yet with the capacity to provide you with the same
stuff.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Thank you. That was quite a tour
through the First Amendment landscape.
I think you put your finger on the crucial question really for
this symposium, and it would be my view that if you pick the
wrong First Amendment standard-setting aside the economic in-
terests of everyone involved of which you spoke so eloquently-the
effect upon the political and social life of this country could be
disastrous. The reason is that you have to assume in the future that
print is not going to have a great force on opinion-making and the
role that print played in this century will be taken over by the elec-
tronic media, and if the electronic media ends up with more regula-
tion than print has had, as a generality, we're going to be worse
off, because we're going to have less freedom to communicate and
to speak and write. So the issue that we're talking about is no
small matter. I can't think of anything more important that I've
ever thought about.
Secondly, if we pick the wrong approach in legislation-and
what I want to talk about now and go back to you, Rich, if I
could-then you end up with the same result, because if your legis-
lative model effectively picks the wrong standard, then you're just
as bad off as if the court picks the wrong standard. I was wonder-
ing what you think about, can I call it the "Title VII approach" and
call that the "Clinton approach," and also about the two bills in
Congress in light of where you were coming from when you fin-
ished talking. You were talking about the common carrier model,
and you were telling us you had some questions about it and
whether it was the right kind of model to take us into the future.
Then we heard from the government, which expanded that point of
view, and then we heard the First Amendment standard. Now
we're back to you. Do you have any problems from your point of
view with respect to the two bills we talked about and the Clinton
approach? I don't want to put you on the spot. Maybe you can
speak individually, maybe Sprint doesn't want to go on record,
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whatever you want, but I'd like to hear some views on these bills.
MR. DEVLIN: Jim, I guess I don't know enough about Title
VII to comment on it. The Markey-Fields bill-we're very sup-
portive of it, even though we have telephone companies. The bill
is structured to open up local telephone companies to competition.
Among other things, the bill would preempt state regulation, entry
regulation. In other words, telephone companies today largely have
an exclusive franchise-that would go away, under this federal bill;
the feds would preempt the states. There would be interconnection
standards so that competitors would be able to freely interconnect
with the local networks. You know, it's very clear to us that this
is the way things are going. Andy did a wonderful job in explain-
ing who else is out there in terms of direct broadcast satellites. We
have seen power companies-in fact, we're doing a joint-venture
trial with the power company, putting fiber throughout locations for
the stated purpose of load management. That is, the electric com-
pany believes it can justify putting fiber to customers' premises
solely based on cost savings on managing electrical loads. So we
do see competition out there. We're very much supportive of that,
even though it's clear we're going to lose our franchise, if you
will, our monopoly in the areas where we're the local telephone
company. It's a long way about going. I'm still not sure yet how
we come down relative to cable companies.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Let me try this out on you and you
can come back to me on this point, because we're going to go an-
other ten minutes and then we're going to run out of time. But
from my point of view just as a First Amendment-nik, I look at
common carriage as the enemy of the First Amendment. I mean
that is the worst thing that can happen to the First Amendment,
because the government makes a decision-which makes a lot of
sense for your telephone operations-to deprive the telephone com-
pany of speech in certain instances-those instances being when I
want to talk to you. There's no place for the telephone company
to speak, and for a whole variety of reasons we want that result,
but to apply that to cable, which we can talk about now, seems to
me to be very dangerous, and what I was wondering about with
respect to the cable part of these bills, is that both bills and the
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Clinton-Title VII approach place a great emphasis on access-and
access to me is just another way of saying common carriage-and
I wonder if there's any reaction to that.
MR. DEVLIN: Boy, I guess I don't share your views on com-
mon carriage being the enemy of the First Amendment, if you will.
I mean, in a fully competitive environment where there are a lot of
players out there, I agree, everyone should have a voice, and it is
offensive that one speaker is precluded from speaking. But the
reality is both the local markets and the cable markets are heavily
dominated by one player, and if you give them a voice and you
allow them to have a strong financial interest in their own voice
and can exclude others, I think you've done major damage in terms
of getting diverse programming to the public.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: So then the provisions of access
here in the bills, they're okay from your point of view.
MR. DEVLIN: It's a slightly different issue. If you're going
to have competition and there's going to be real and meaningful
competition, then I agree with you-that you don't need common
carrier regulation. But we're not there now.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Do you want to respond to my
point too, Mr. Hirt? Because maybe the two of you would be on
same side; I don't know where Mr. Merdek is going to come out
in this. He's going to give us the Bentham answer, what Jeremy
Bentham would tell us. Go ahead.
MR. HIRT: Well, I would try to "put on the hat" of a policy-
maker, again emphasizing that this is not an official view. It seems
to me that any use of the term is not only value-laden, but prece-
dent-laden, in terms of "common carrier" versus "broadcast" model
versus whatever other model. I'd like to step back to first princi-
ples and say that even if you don't care for the principles that the
administration has talked about-you've already been told in terms
of the case law either in Associated Press or NCCB65-that you're
looking at a greater public interest. Maybe "common carrier" is
not the term we ought to use for that broader public interest. But,
65. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
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as Rich pointed out, the 1994 reality is the same whether we're
talking about cable, whether we're talking about a telephone com-
pany, whether we're talking about an amalgamation or a joint ven-
ture of them, or direct broadcast satellites as a new competitor. At
the local level-the telephone subscriber, the would-be subscriber
to a cable system, the person who doesn't have cable and who is
still strictly limited to over the air broadcasting, or the local munic-
ipality which still has the reality of one franchise-we still have,
if I can use the word loosely, an oligopoly-type situation. I'm not
going to get into Preferred Communications66 as to what may ulti-
mately be the law as to multiple franchises. I'm not an antitrust
lawyer; all I'm saying is that First Amendment reality is that we're
looking for a robust marketplace of ideas in which diverse speakers
can be heard.
The dilemma we have, and the balancing that's talked
about-"must carry" is an example and a lot of the other cases are
examples-is balancing the rights and interests of an existing or
would-be speaker who has access to that very expensive soap box,
but against the outside world wanting to come in by way of access.
Or you have the listener or the viewer, meaning you and I, saying
we want to have a certain menu of programming. So to me, may-
be being naive on this point, the term "common carrier," although
I understand the ramifications of it, makes me return to first princi-
ples, which is what is the broader public interest. Keeping in mind
that whether we're talking about common carriers or the broadcast-
er-licensee framework, those entities are still ultimately answerable
to the public interest. I'm not saying this rhetorically-therefore
the First Amendment is a dead letter, and therefore it's subordinate
to a greater good. All I'm saying is that we're talking about a
balancing, and we still have to use these terms of "bottlenecks" and
"information bottlenecks." We still have access problems, and my
personal view is we will have access problems, for a lot of reasons,
into the foreseeable future, which is why it's very difficult to
"freeze" a model in place. Maybe this new Title VII is the answer
66. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir.
1994).
[Vol. 4:663
1994] SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON NEW MEDIA ALLIANCES 697
to that, because the model will emerge and maybe it won't be fixed
in stone.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Well this argument's.been going on
ever since 1932 or 1933 when the FCC passed the broadcasting
act,67 because the arguments you made are the very same argu-
ments that were made there-and it's the very same argument that
lost in Tornillo.68 What disturbs me, I must say however, on Title
VII is that it seems to me that the common carrier model is what
Title VII is talking about. All the public policy arguments you
make are very good, but it does mean government supervision that
we haven't had in our information structure historically. What
would Jeremy O'Bentham say?
MR. MERDEK: I'm not sure what he'd say but I want to
respond to a couple of things that Rich and Ted have said. I think
they made some good points. Ted said in prefacing his economic
discussion of this that he's not an antitrust lawyer, and one of the
things we tend to forget when we're either legislating or adjudicat-
ing in this area is that while we're trying to wrap all of this in the
flag of the First Amendment, there really is a heavy collection of
antitrust laws and enforcement mechanisms out there for the pur-
pose of correcting problems with markets. You know when you
passed the 1992 Cable Act, as Congress did, with a preamble and
findings relating to economic dysfunction and dislocation and the
need to correct abusive practices and all of that, what you're really
doing is taking the place of what otherwise would be done by and
through the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission,
State Attorneys General, private litigation from competitors, and
private litigation from customers. There are lots of ways to fix
economic dislocation without disrupting the First Amendment, and
I think Jim Goodale's point about disrupting it is a good one. As
we get into a world where electronic communications and moving
pictures with sound pretty much replace the words in your newspa-
per as your principal and immediate means of communicating all
67. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current
version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
68. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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these bits of news and ideas, you run a real risk if that principal
means of disseminating the core information that the First Amend-
ment's there to protect gets some lesser standard of protection than
print media does.
I worry about that for a couple of reasons. One of them is
because of my own background in the newspaper business, and it's
hard to see newspapers being less important, given what they've
done historically, than the electronic stuff. But the other is that we
are living in a world where increasingly we've got two classes of
people, those that can read and those that can't. Everybody in this
room obviously is in the rather privileged class and you do have
access to newspapers even though you may find cable coverage of
the Gulf War or some other electronic communication more imme-
diate-a picture is worth a thousand words, and a moving picture
is worth God knows how many for imparting information to you
more quickly. There's a lot of people out there on the street who
can't read, and this electronic revolution and convergence may be
a saving grace for them. It's the only way they can get all this
information, but it also may be-returning to my cynical economic
viewpoint-too expensive for them. What we may end up with if
we're not careful is a couple of classes of society-one of which
who can afford all this stuff in their home, and one of which who
can't. It's one of the reasons why, as Ted was saying, the adminis-
tration's preference for universal service and open access is so
important. If 94 percent of the people have telephones right now,
that's worth maintaining because even if you can't read, you can
talk. But if this converged cable-telco, whatever it's going to be
called-technology, two-way, interactive, broadband, digital-
switched, whatever-is going to cost you a hundred dollars rather
than ten dollars to get, you're going to disenfranchise an awful lot
of folks, and even Jeremy Bentham wouldn't go for that.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Well, are there any other comments
from the panel, so we can have a last word, and maybe we'll take
.one question from the audience.
MR. HIRT: My final word is to give one other way of looking
at the nature of the protections we talked about, and you'll hear
about this in the other panels. Trying to come up with models as
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we've talked about has pitfalls to it. I think that the other perspec-
tive to look at is the function or the activity being regulated, and
Tornillo may represent an extreme, if you will, because that was
viewed as an attack on the core editorial right of the newspaper to
speak and say what it wanted to and then not have to give equal
time to the opponent. I think that's a far cry from a lot of the
other things that have been litigated, whether it's the fairness doc-
trine in Red Lion, whether it's "must carry," or a whole host of
other things. As you can tell from what the government has stated
in pending cases, we have emphasized the issue of: is the activity
something that is viewpoint-neutral? to what extent is it content-
related? to what extent, going to the other extreme, is it trying to
rectify market dysfunction that dates back to the Associated Press-
type of line of cases? So one perspective is to look at the end-
user, as I've talked about, the franchisor or the cable subscriber or
the telephone subscriber. Another way to look at it is to examine
what is being regulated. Because if we're balancing the interests,
I think the key question is whether the government is regulating or
is it directly infringing upon "editorial judgment." No matter how
you slice it, quite frankly, the industries we're talking about have
unique access to this information highway as it is presently struc-
tured, and who knows how it will be structured within the next
decade? So I'm not at all trying to say we're stripping away the
First Amendment protections. All I'm saying is that these doc-
trines have to be applied in a very carefully crafted way and one
can look at the function of the regulation as well as the broader
public interest that I talked about earlier.
PROFESSOR GOODALE: Any questions from the audience?
Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER69: Professor Goodale, do you agree
with Mr. Merdek that the O'Brien model is the appropriate First
Amendment standard for the future?
PROFESSOR GOODALE: I don't think we call it the O'Brien
model. We call it the O'Bentham model, because it was a very
69. Allison J. Unger, Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal.
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flexible model where you're balancing this against that and so
forth.
I would just point out that the O'Brien model is supposed to be
a model for regulating viewpoint-neutral speech, and the interest in
the application of the O'Brien test is supposed to be substan-
tial-it's not just a substantial interest by the way, it's a substantial
interest unrelated to speech. What's happened, I think, in all the
cases the cable industry has argued, is that the cable industry has
forgotten what the substantial interest was supposed to be. Burning
the draft card, in the O'Brien test, is an interest unrelated to
speech, and what's happened is that because of the early 1977
cable case in which the D.C. Circuit pushed out the O'Brien test,70
it's been adopted by the cable industry ever since. I think really
what the cable industry has done, without realizing it, is it has
substituted the broadcast test for the O 'Brien test. I think we might
end on this-those of you like Allison, who have taken my course,
know I can go on for hours on this point-but I really think the
issue is probably well stated by Mr. Hirt on my right, which is he
thinks, and he may be right, that we're always going to end up
with some sort of conflict between viewers' interests and speakers'
interests, and if that's one's view of what the future is, then we use
O'Brien. But let's remember, it's not O'Brien we're using. We're
using the broadcast test. We're right back to broadcast regulation.
That may be the appropriate answer. I don't happen to think so,
but there are a lot of arguments pro and con.
Why don't we end on that note and get to your next panel.
70. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977).
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